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Dimensions of a Maritime Defense Strategy
Tomohisa Takei
Your Majesty, King of Zhao, if you serve the King of Qin, he will ask to 
be given the castles of Yiyand and Cheng Gao. If you provide the castles 
this year, the King of Qin will then tell you to give him some land the 
next year. If you give away parcels of land, eventually the amount of 
land suitable for release will be reduced, and, if you do not provide land, 
then everything that you have done up until now will become useless, 
and eventually you will run into big trouble. . . . [W]ithout doing any 
battle, your land will be sliced away, continuously.
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THE NEW TIME AND SPACE
 Compared with previous years, the Japanese defense white paper for fiscal year 2016 devoted more pages to discussing territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea—where China has been behaving with disrespect to international 
norms. The Chinese are overriding international law with Chinese civil law. 
China’s activities, such as reclamation activities on submerged features, reefs, 
and rocks, have exacerbated longstanding territorial disputes among Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. International and regional at-
tention has been drawn to the decision in favor of the Philippines versus China 
by a tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and held in the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague.
In the Spratly Islands, China purports to build 
seven “islands” from reclaimed coral and sand.1 It 
takes significant effort, time, and expense to build 
dry land from scratch by “reclaiming” it onto a 
reef. Even Subi Reef, the closest of these features to 
China, is located 510 nautical miles (approximately 
950 kilometers) from Hainan Island. In disregard 
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THE NEW TIME AND SPACE
of generally accepted land-reclamation practices, the Chinese allow no time for 
the foundation to stabilize; instead they build multiple facilities right away and 
militarize the area� Just two years after starting reclamation activities at Fiery 
Cross Reef, for example, China announced the completion of a three-thousand- 
meter runway and peripheral facilities� China also conducted a test flight of a 
civilian airplane on January 2, 2016� By early 2017, facilities had been completed 
for twenty-four military aircraft on three reclaimed “islands”: Fiery Cross Reef, 
Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef� The Vietnamese government condemned this act as 
an infringement of sovereignty�2 According to estimates based on similar projects 
in Japan, the costs to build an artificial island as big as the one on Fiery Cross Reef 
(2�74 square kilometers in area, five meters in height), pave a three-thousand-
meter runway, and build an airport with all the necessary ancillary facilities (e�g�, 
aircraft warning lights and guide lights) could be as high as U�S�$2�4 billion (¥240 
billion)�3
China is executing six construction projects similar to the Fiery Cross Reef 
reclamation simultaneously, bringing several dredging boats and pump dredgers 
to expedite the effort� Many view this activity as an effort to gain territorial con-
trol of the South China Sea� Neighboring countries and the international com-
munity at large, including Japan and the United States, have pursued peaceful, 
legal resolutions of this issue, so far to no avail�4
From August 5 through August 9, 2016, while two to three hundred Chinese 
fishing boats were operating around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, 
up to fifteen China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered and exited the contiguous 
zone repeatedly, and fifteen CCG vessels entered Japanese territorial waters (i�e�, 
within twelve nautical miles of shore) during this short period�5 Considering the 
abnormal number of CCG vessels (three to four have been more common for 
such incursions) and their intrusion into territorial waters, the Japanese govern-
ment made a diplomatic protest to the Chinese government� Suspicions arose 
that the activities of the many fishing boats and CCG vessels operating in the area 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands actually constituted an invasion being directed 
by the Chinese government, especially because after the most intrusive entry to 
date occurred on August 9 the invasion of territorial waters suddenly paused—
abnormal behavior for ordinary fishermen�
Two issues emerged from these events in the South and East China Seas�
The first is that China has demonstrated that it has the resources to carry 
out multiple massive, expensive marine-construction projects simultaneously 
and quickly, and it seemingly disregards limitations imposed by UNCLOS and 
complaints from the international community� China’s one-party-rule political 
system makes it easy for the Chinese Communist Party to control and direct 
numerous fishing boats and deploy a large force of CCG vessels�
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The second issue is that the land-reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands 
and the dispute over the Senkaku Islands both can be considered part of China’s 
strategy to expand its maritime claims in the region� The nature of the country’s 
political system, combined with the massive economic resources available to it, 
provides China with the flexibility needed to adjust the speed and scale with 
regard to time and space considerations for its territorial-expansionist maritime 
strategy� No other country in the Asia-Pacific region can match China in this re-
gard� Consequently, every effort must be made to avoid “mirror imaging” China 
when analyzing the current security environment�
This article examines the concepts of time and space from the perspective of a 
status quo nation that seeks to deter the designs of a revisionist power, and helps 
formulate a new maritime self-defense strategy for Japan that serves as a useful 
reference for small and medium-sized countries that seek to preserve stability in 
their regions�
THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE TIME DIMENSION
During the height of America’s military intervention in Vietnam, from 1965 to 
1968, the quantity and quality of the American military was so overpowering vis-
à-vis the Vietcong, along with their North Vietnamese allies, that it seemed the 
United States could not lose the war� But, as Yōnosuke Nagai observed in his Jikan 
no Seijigaku (Politics and Time), one must understand America’s loss in terms of 
who lost to whom�
Conclusively speaking, it is a cruel historical fact that the metropolitan power, em-
powered through an urban industrial/technological society, lost to [the Vietcong], 
empowered through a primitive, agricultural society� This battle was not a simplistic 
battle of military “ability” but a battle of “will�” While the battle of “ability” is basi-
cally a spatial and quantitative battle, the battle of “will” is determined by the system’s 
stamina size, or the size of the sacrifice (cost) measured by time�6
In other words, as the struggle became protracted, an increasingly war-weary 
American citizenry lost its will to fight� In contrast, the North Vietnamese, de-
spite dramatic battlefield losses and the defeat of the Vietcong following the Tet 
Offensive, eventually prevailed because they never lost their will to fight, despite 
the passage of time�
Nagai also notes two asymmetries that generally (including in the Vietnam 
War) work to the advantage of a liberation army fighting against a government 
army: (1) The existence of sanctuaries helps the liberation army avoid defeat� 
(2) The liberation army—the revisionist force—takes the initiative against the 
government army—the status quo defenders�7 The Vietnam War was an asym-
metrical battle between a metropolitan power, the United States, and a libera-
tion army� The liberation army based itself in its sanctuary of North Vietnam, 
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supported by China and the Soviet Union, and used this advantage to carry out 
guerrilla war freely against South Vietnam� Over time, the liberation army took 
advantage of the two asymmetries, patiently continuing to fight in such a way 
as to avoid defeat� The war eventually exhausted the will of the metropolitan 
power to continue to fight� The liberation army skillfully used a “ripening-time” 
strategy—it waited until the time was ripe, then took decisive action�8
National liberation wars that follow such a ripening-time strategy, such as the 
Vietnam War and the Algerian War, continue to be fought today, such as in Af-
ghanistan, Syria, and North Africa� However, in these modern conflicts we see a 
variation in the strategy in the form of indiscriminate terror attacks, such as those 
carried out by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)� Not only does ISIL 
send terrorists disguised as Middle Eastern refugees into Europe; it uses social 
media to promote its version of violent extremism, sending out propaganda and 
encouraging terrorism� Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Syrian 
civil war and Libya’s domestic disorder have flooded Europe� This phenomenon, 
accompanied by continuing terrorist acts, has made the member states of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) suspicious about refugees, which led to a fundamental shift 
in EU refugee policy� ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks are intended to demon-
strate the organization’s power and to exhaust the national will of those opposed 
to it� In this context, ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks can be categorized as part 
of a ripening-time strategy�
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea using “hybrid warfare” and its promotion 
of conflict in eastern Ukraine, like China’s one-sided land-reclamation activities 
in the South China Sea, exhibit characteristics of the ripening-time strategy�9 
Russia’s military is overwhelmingly more powerful than Ukraine’s, and Russia has 
placed about forty thousand soldiers in the vicinity of the shared border� Ukraine 
cannot recapture Crimea, and because Russian public opinion strongly supports 
President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, Russia can maintain its efforts—fighting 
to avoid defeat—and wait until Ukraine loses its will to fight and concedes�10
With regard to the South China Sea, China has pursued a strategy similar to 
Russia’s in Crimea and eastern Ukraine� China’s land-reclamation activities, its 
construction of harbor and airport facilities, and its militarization of the entire 
body of water have ensured China’s actual control over the features under dis-
pute� Now China waits for the international community to lose its will to contest 
Chinese actions�
On July 12, 2016, an Annex VII arbitration tribunal denied China’s claim to 
historic title within the area of the “nine-dash line” as being incompatible with 
UNCLOS� It further determined that the Spratly Islands consist only of mere 
rocks and low-tide elevations, rather than islands that can sustain human habi-
tation; only the latter would have been entitled to an exclusive economic zone 
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(EEZ)� Consequently, regardless of which state has lawful title to the features in 
the Spratly Islands, those features are entitled, at most, to a territorial sea; no fea-
ture generates an EEZ� Specifically, the court’s ruling noted that four of the seven 
China-controlled “lands” were constructed on rocks; they accrue twelve nautical 
miles of territorial waters, but not an EEZ or an extended continental shelf� The 
other three features, Subi, Hugh (or Hughes), and Mischief Reefs, are low-tide 
elevations in that they are above water at low tide but submerged at high tide� 
These features are considered to be part of the seabed; no state may claim title 
over them� If they lie in the EEZ of a coastal state, that state does enjoy exclusive 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the living and nonliving resources of the 
features� However, almost half of the seven features in question are located within 
two hundred nautical miles of the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia, which dis-
pute ownership with China, while the remaining features are located on the high 
seas, belonging to no country and falling within no country’s EEZ�11 Because EEZ 
borders in the South China Sea are not finalized, the several countries involved 
are left fighting over the “territory” of the Spratlys and many other small features, 
sometimes trying to seize control by force (even if on a small scale), through land 
reclamation, or both�
The seven features where China is reinforcing its control have been trans-
formed from their original state, and CCG patrol vessels now block foreign ves-
sels from the area� The number of ships in the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
and the CCG continues to expand, now exceeding the totals of their counterparts 
in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines combined�12 Numerous fishing boats 
assigned to the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia further skew the odds 
against China’s regional neighbors in any maritime dispute�
China prefers to conduct only bilateral negotiations with its regional neigh-
bors� To be most effective, interested nations should resist such lopsided negotia-
tions and act only multilaterally� However, some countries with strong economic 
ties to China oppose adoption of a legally binding code of conduct, and as a result 
have prevented ASEAN member states from acting together�13
Confusion and uncertainty in the South China Sea work to China’s advantage� 
The government of the Philippines appears to be losing its will to fight in its ter-
ritorial dispute with China� President Rodrigo Duterte announced on September 
13, 2016, that the Philippines would end joint maritime patrols with the United 
States—to which both parties had agreed previously—in April 2017; thereafter it 
will allow only aerial patrols, and only within territorial waters�14 On September 
28, 2016, while visiting Vietnam, Duterte stated that the Philippines would hold 
the U�S�-Philippine bilateral war games—military exercises that China opposes� 
However, Duterte stated that following the PHIBLEX 33 amphibious exercise, 
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his government also would reinforce its economic relationships with China and 
Russia�15
On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that China has undertaken a cunning 
strategy designed to wear down its regional neighbors: ignore the PCA ruling 
(calling it “a political farce staged under legal pretext”—Wang Yi, China’s minis-
ter of foreign affairs); reinforce control of the artificial islands and surrounding 
waters via CCG patrols; use economic leverage (involving, e�g�, economic aid and 
export/import restrictions) over neighboring countries to demand compromise; 
and squat in the area until disputant nations eventually give up�16
Compared with Russia, China has executed its ripening-time strategy more 
slowly and flexibly, taking advantage of having the world’s second-biggest econo-
my and a single-party political system that offers its leadership almost complete 
autonomy from domestic interference in its foreign and defense policy making� If 
China had taken actions in the South China Sea as clear and aggressive as those of 
Russia in Crimea, nearby nations would have reacted strongly� Instead, to avoid 
fueling its neighbors’ suspicions, China took its time testing the waters to see how 
the international community would react to its slow but continual transgressions� 
Indeed, China has taken further advantage of the power vacuum in the region 
caused by America’s continued preoccupation in the Middle East� Applying its 
vast resources to marine construction projects, China made such significant ter-
ritorial changes over such a short period that it is now impossible to revert to the 
status quo ante� At this point, China need only wait patiently until the nations 
involved give in and compromise�
THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE SPACE DIMENSION
While it waits for a situation to ripen, it is important for a revisionist power 
to restrict the other parties’ ability to seek restitution, and instead to extract 
concessions�
Modern history offers Nazi Germany’s accession of the Sudetenland from 
Czechoslovakia as an example of effectively drawing out concessions from an 
opposing party� As part of its “salami slicing” of eastern Europe, Nazi Germany 
at the 1938 Munich Conference demanded that other countries, principally the 
United Kingdom and France, allow the cession of the Sudetenland, justified by 
the presence of the many ethnic Germans living in that area� The appeasers ac-
ceded to this demand in exchange for a guarantee that Germany would settle 
for these new boundaries and not go to war� The people of western Europe, 
still weary from World War I and remembering how difficult it had been to de-
escalate tensions once mobilization plans were initiated in August of 1914, sought 
to avoid war at all costs�
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In other words, there was no temporal or spatial redundancy in either political 
or military affairs� Public opinion influenced and pressured politicians’ decision-
making processes, to the detriment of more-sound military advice�
These days, the development of truly global information-communications 
technologies means the mass media report incidents that happen on the other 
side of the world as if they occurred next door� Economically, the world is much 
more mutually interdependent than during Hitler’s day; in this way, political as 
well as economic relationships among nations are intimate� As a result, should 
war break out, there is much less spatial redundancy than in the past� If an un-
foreseen armed conflict occurs between China and Japan (the countries with the 
world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively) the effect on the world 
economy and international affairs would be devastating—even if the war zone 
were limited geographically�
In a strategic environment such as this, revisionist powers have taken the 
initiative—China and Russia already have crossed the line� By contrast, status 
quo powers tend to be psychologically suppressed, desiring to avoid retaliating 
with military force or even exercising a police function� Revisionists, by their 
willingness to take the initiative at any time, can manipulate the rate by which 
they increase their governmental presence, encouraging status quo states to con-
clude that a forceful response is not necessary� Then revisionists can expand their 
military operations in the area slowly, increasing the tempo gradually, such as by 
adding air operations to sea operations, or vice versa�
Human senses have thresholds� For example, when exposed to loud noise, 
your hearing gradually becomes immune; and if continuously pricked with a 
needle, eventually you feel no pain� The threshold for enduring pain rises as time 
goes by� Similarly, if revisionist actions are repeated and expanded with some 
subtlety, the mass media and the international community will accept such ac-
tions as the new norm, unless the status quo powers take some kind of sudden, 
unexpectedly aggressive action�
When revisionist powers practice salami tactics skillfully in peacetime, it 
imperceptibly raises the pain threshold� If defenders of the status quo take no 
action in the face of graduated, repetitive aggression, it suggests acceptance 
of a new stasis� One act of appeasement will lead to another� For defenders 
of the status quo, how to put a stop to the cycle of appeasement is a crucial 
challenge�
SOLUTIONS TO THE NEW SPACE AND TIME
As a useful example for understanding space and time in the new security envi-
ronment, consider NATO’s response to Russia�
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Altering the Space Dimension
To increase their security in the face of salami tactics, small and medium-sized 
powers have only two choices: appeasement or collective security through bilat-
eral or multilateral alliances� Alliances bolster deterrence by creating closer rela-
tionships among the threatened states, thereby making the space “denser�” During 
the Cold War, NATO and the neutral states of northern Europe recognized this 
reality and reacted effectively to Russian aggression in the region�
In 1994, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine signed 
the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which Ukraine 
gave up its nuclear weapons� In exchange, the signatories promised that they 
would not use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
Ukraine�17 However, twenty years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed the 
Crimean Peninsula, then muscled in on the Donets region of eastern Ukraine, 
both enclaves of Russian speakers with historic and cultural links to Moscow� 
Fighting continues today between the forces of the Ukrainian government and 
the rebel armed forces—another revisionist effort initiated by a power out to 
challenge the status quo in defiance of international law�18
NATO condemned Russia’s activities as an attempt to destabilize eastern 
Ukraine and a violation of international law� NATO and its member states repeat-
edly called on Russia to withdraw from Crimea and fulfill its obligations under 
international law�19 NATO held a summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and issued a 
communiqué that branded a wide variety of Russian activities destabilizing to 
the European security environment� The cited actions included the ongoing il-
legal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea; the violation of sovereign borders by 
force; the deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine; and large-scale exercises 
and other provocative military activities near NATO borders, including in the 
Baltic and Black Sea regions and the eastern Mediterranean�20
Although historically Sweden’s foreign policy has opposed participation in 
military alliances in general, the Swedish government made clear in 2009 that it 
supported multinational security and cooperation� It enthusiastically promoted 
security cooperation and interactions with other countries through international 
institutions, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe� 
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Sweden, although not a member of NATO, 
reinforced its relations with the organization by signing the memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) regarding host-nation support� Sweden also is building 
bilateral, multilayered, cooperative security relationships with other countries�21 
On June 8, 2016, Sweden’s minister of defense, Peter Hultqvist, signed a letter of 
intent with his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, to enhance defense coop-
eration� This followed an earlier defense-cooperation understanding with the 
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United Kingdom in 2014� While there is no mutual defense obligation between 
Sweden and the United States, their MOU laid out five key aims: enhancing in-
teroperability, strengthening capabilities and posture through training and exer-
cises, deepening armament cooperation, advancing cooperation in research and 
development, and meeting common challenges in multinational operations�22
Finland’s foreign and defense policies are similar to Sweden’s in many ways, 
but there are some differences� After Finland became independent from Russia in 
1917, it attempted to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union, a coun-
try with which it shares a long, troubled border� Finland remained more neutral 
militarily than Sweden (i�e�, less Westward tilting)� For example, the Agreement 
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1948, was canceled 
in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but Finland replaced it with a 
basic treaty with Russia� Then, after Finland joined the EU in 1995, it changed 
its policy to “military non-alignment, backed up by a credible national defense�” 
After Russia annexed Crimea, Finland, also a nonmember of NATO, enhanced 
its relationship with the organization by signing the MOU regarding host-nation 
support in 2014�23 On July 9, 2016, in connection with NATO’s Warsaw summit, 
Finnish defense minister Jussi Niinistö and his British counterpart, Michael 
Fallon, signed a declaratory expression of intent between their countries�24 The 
document does not obligate Finland or Britain to provide mutual assistance in 
the event of a crisis, but rather sets a framework for cooperation�25 A short time 
later, on August 22, Niinistö told Reuters that Finland also was negotiating a 
defense-collaboration agreement with the United States�26
Motivating these changes in the foreign policies of Sweden and Finland, in-
cluding the rapid enhancement of their relationships with NATO, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom, are Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the 
continuing “hybrid warfare” being practiced in eastern Ukraine, and the growing 
military competition between NATO and Russia in and around the Baltic Sea�
Altering the Time Dimension
Deterrence also can be reinforced by improving military readiness with regard 
to time� The following discussion continues to consider the example of northern 
Europe, where NATO has placed combat troops in the Baltic countries and Po-
land, each of which shares a border with Russia�
The histories of all four of these countries provided grounds for profound sus-
picion of Russia; in particular, Poland has been partitioned many times over the 
centuries� After the Cold War, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania did try to 
maintain good relationships with their large eastern neighbor, but for reasons of 
national security they also took steps to enhance their relationships with NATO 
and the EU� They joined NATO to avail themselves of the principle of collective 
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self-defense�27 After the Russian annexation of Crimea in the name of protecting 
Russians, it is not surprising that these countries requested that NATO station 
troops on their territories� Latvia is particularly vulnerable, as 40 percent of its 
population is Russian speaking; Estonia’s equivalent proportion is 30 percent� 
Poland shares a border with Ukraine� It is easy to understand why these countries 
are particularly fearful of what Russia might do�
At the same July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO welcomed the offers of Canada, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to serve as framework 
nations for a robust, multinational forward presence� Beginning in early 2017, 
that enhanced forward presence was to rest on four battalion-sized battle groups 
introduced into Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, provided by framework nations 
and other contributing allies�28 To enhance its presence in its southern area, such 
as Romania, NATO further decided to improve integrated training�29 However, 
establishing a forward allied military presence is not a sufficient deterrent�
In a discussion focused on China’s antiaccess/area-denial strategy, Aaron L� 
Friedberg invokes a more general principle: that the most difficult question con-
fronting U�S� military planners is not what kind of military power they should 
use, but how aggressively American military power should be used in an oppo-
nent’s land� At a critical moment, if the opponent discerns that the United States 
has neither the intention nor the ability to employ its military power on the op-
ponent’s territory, the leader of that opposing country will not fear retaliation and 
will underestimate the risk of war that an attack will cause; he will devote more 
resources toward mounting an offense than to maintaining a defense�30
Applying Friedberg’s logic to the future of eastern Europe, if Russia believes 
NATO has no specific response plan and is not ready to retaliate out of concern 
for Russian escalation, there is little to deter Russia from continuing its salami 
tactics� The main purpose of positioning NATO troops in the Baltic countries is 
to deter Russia’s next action�31 Will NATO’s forces counterattack against Russia, 
despite the risk of escalation? The answer to this question is at the core of NATO’s 
existence�
Space and Time
These two responses to the new security environment—making space more 
dense and speeding up the readiness timetable—are intended to prevent ad-
ditional applications of salami tactics by China and Russia� Where a situation 
seems to have reached the last stage of a ripening-time strategy (i�e�, the revision 
is almost completed), is there any way to recover?
Russia’s action in Crimea is clearly illegal, but as a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) Russia can veto any UNSC resolution� Russia also 
has more military power than Ukraine, including nuclear weapons� It would 
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be difficult for Ukraine to recover its illegally occupied territory anytime soon� 
Ukraine’s only viable strategy is to maintain its citizens’ will, thereby preventing 
the situation from “ripening” any further� It must continue patiently to negotiate 
within a multinational environment, understanding that any favorable resolution 
will take significant time�
The best global strategy to prevent larger powers from intimidating weaker 
ones into making concessions is to never accept any change to the status quo 
and never confer legitimacy on the illegal use of force� The status quo ante must 
be maintained� To avoid giving revisionist powers even the smallest opportunity 
to undermine stability, small and medium-sized nations also should take proac-
tive measures, such as reinforcing alliances and creating favorable international 
public opinion� Deterrence also can be improved by enhancing collaborative 
relationships with other nations in areas for which no collective-defense system 
like NATO exists�
Whether applied reactively or proactively, the basic concepts discussed in this 
article should be understood and employed dynamically� Static military measures 
meant to maintain a status quo are meaningless� States need the capability to 
respond to peacetime salami tactics by revisionist powers to a degree calibrated 
not to cross the threshold of excessive force� To do so, it is important to have 
available and to deploy, at the right time and in the right way, both a dynamic 
police force and such military power as will enable a country to deter or respond 
to the situation�
Globally, military conflict is expanding� Small and medium-sized states facing 
intimidation from revisionist powers naturally hesitate to employ military force, 
even in their own defense� But in the new security environment, in which revi-
sionist powers ingeniously adjust and rebalance the status quo, states must plan 
for an opponent’s initiatives, maintain the ability to act, and be sure of the politi-
cal will to use force in a crisis, despite the risks of escalation� Above all, the key to 
calming a crisis before it escalates is to return to the original state of affairs before 
the revisionist power enters the waiting-game phase of a ripening-time strategy�
The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has dispatched its patrol ships and aircraft into 
the sea and air areas around the Senkaku Islands� This helps to maintain security 
and reinforces the effectiveness of JMSDF surveillance activities in the sea and air 
domains� Even now, four years after property rights to the Senkaku Islands were 
transferred from private parties to the Japanese government, the mass media’s 
interest in East China Sea affairs remains high, and they continue to broadcast 
JCG reports on the activities of Chinese vessels in the waters near the Senkakus� 
Japanese citizens maintain high awareness of the current situation, and their in-
terest in the Senkaku Islands ensures the government will protect the islands and 
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Japanese citizens� Japan’s response stance is at the threshold level� Mass-media 
contributions such as these undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping public 
attitudes, which helps prevent China from unilaterally altering current condi-
tions as part of a ripening-time strategy�
This article has analyzed the security-environment dimensions of time and 
space, from the perspective of status quo–maintaining nations� The discussion 
should provide readers with some ideas bearing on Japan’s maritime self-defense 
strategy and its future national security with regard to China� More generally, 
the article illustrates that the current security challenges vis-à-vis revisionist 
states such as Russia and China are complex; any attempt to address changes in 
the status quo is complicated by the many actions and calculations of different 
parties� Such a situation cannot be explained using military rationales alone, and 
must be addressed using a multilateral approach that employs all the instruments 
of power�
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